The Law of Nations in the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims by Aliens Under 28 U.S.C § 1350 by Crotty, Thomas P
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 5
1-1-1977
The Law of Nations in the District Courts: Federal
Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims by Aliens Under 28
U.S.C § 1350
Thomas P. Crotty
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas P. Crotty, The Law of Nations in the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims by
Aliens Under 28 U.S.C § 1350, 1 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 71 (1977),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol1/iss1/5
The Law of Nations in the District Courts: 
Federal Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims by Aliens 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
INTRODUCTION 
Since The Judiciary Act of 1789 the district courts of the 
United States have had original jurisdiction, under section 
1350 of the Judicial Code, "of all causes where an alien sues 
for a tort only in violation of the laws of nations or a treaty 
of the United States." 1 But the courts have persistently re-
fused to find jurisdiction under the statute, and a recent Sec-
ond Circuit opinion,2 upholding the disInissal of a claim brought 
under this section, declared that the law of nations "deals 
primarily with the relationship among nations rather than 
among individuals ... [and] has been held not to be self ex-
ecuting so as to vest a plaintiff with individual legal rights." 8 
1 Judiciary Act § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) Codi1ied as § 1350 of Title 28, U.S.C., 
the act now reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort onl;y, committed in violation of the laws of nations 
or a treaty of the United States." 
2 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, - U.s. -, 
50 L. Ed. 2d 101; 97 S. Ct. 102 (1976). 
8Id. 534 F.2d at 31. The case arose upon the following faets. In 1938 Will;y 
Dreyfus, a Jew and a resident of Germany, was forced by the German government 
to sell his interest in the banking firm of J. Dreyfus & Co. to August Von Finck 
and Merek, Finck & Co. for one and one-half million dollars below its actual value, 
and to emigrate to Switzerland. Following World War II an agreement for addi-
tional compensation was made between the parties but was allegedly repudiated by 
the defendants. 
Dreyfus commenced an action in the Southern District of New York in 1973 by 
attaching certain of defendants' assets in New York City. The District Court dis-
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This interpretation of the law of nations is consistent with 
prior decisions of American courts.' 
An earlier Second Circuit decision II labeled section 1350 "a 
kind of legal Lohengrin ... although it has been with us since 
the first Judiciary Act . . . no one seems to know whence it 
came." 8 This article will attempt to show "whence it came" 
by discussing the history of the law of nations, especially the 
law of nations in 1789, as it related to individual rights, and 
analyzing briefly the development of the law of nations since 
1789. And finally it will be considered whether, in light of 
recent theory concerning the place of the individual in inter-
national law, section 1350 can and should have any usefulness 
for future plaintiffs. 
THE LAw OF NATIONS To 1789 
The roots of the law of nations may be traced back to the 
Roman concept of jus gentium which, in turn, had as its un-
derlying principle the Greek concept of jus naturale, an ex-
ternal criterion of right conduct common to all peoples.T The 
Roman 'concept, unlike the Greek, was a practical one used to 
distinguish between the citizens of Rome and those non-citizens 
subject to the control of the empire. jus gentium, the law 
missed the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding, in 
part, that neither the alleged seizure of plaintiff's property nor the allegedly wrong-
ful repudiation of the 1948 settlement agreement constituted violations of the laws 
of nations. 
4 Bee Khedivial Line, B.A.E. v. Beafarers' International Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d 
Cir. 1960) (per curiam); Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Bupp. 324 
(E.D. Pa. 1963); Damaskinos v. Bocieta Navigacion Interamericana, B.A., Panama, 
255 F. Bupp. 919 (B.D.N.Y. 1966). 
In only one case, Abdul·Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Bupp. 857 (D. Mel. 
1961), did a court find that the individual plaintiff was able to state a claim under 
section 1350 for a violation of the law of nations and as will be discussed, '''fra, 
pp. 80·81, that decision is consistent with the American precedents. 
II llT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
II Id. at 1015. 
TRUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT, 1·4 (1975) [Hereinafter 
RUDDY]. 
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common to all peoples, applied to Romans and non-Romans 
alike, but the Roman civil law applied only to citizens.8 
From this background came the theory of natural law which 
was to peak in the eighteenth century.& This new natural law 
was grounded on the theory that there are, in the very na-
ture of things, universally acceptable principles of right and 
wrong.10 It differed from the older Roman concept in that 
the natural law was not that which could be empirically shown 
to be the law common to all peoples. Rather, eighteenth cen-
tury notions of natural law placed a heavy emphasis on the 
"ought" of norms which could be regarded as correct, rather 
than the "is" of norms which were actually enforced. In-
deed, under the natural law theory accepted in the eighteenth 
century, a law which was commonly enforced by all peoples 
could still have been considered a nullity since it violated the 
right and wrong inherent in the nature of things.u 
While natural law theory was developing toward its eight-
eenth century zenith, the international political situation in 
Europe was also changing.12 The Papacy, long the recog-
nized sovereign power in Europe, was weakening. By the 
fourteenth century the sovereignty of several states had been 
sufficiently established that a theory of law regarding their 
relationships toward each other was required. IS The law of 
nations which emerged to meet this need relied heavily on 
the natural law theory which sought to define the law of in-
dividuals. The result was an overlap of the law of individuals 
and their relationship toward each other and the law of the 
interrelationship of nations. Theorists of the law of nations 
did not produce a clearly defined law of nations concerned 
only with nations as interacting entities; the new law dealt 
also with the rights asserted by individuals against sovereigns. 
8 Id. 
D See generally, w. 
10 Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of InternationaZ Law! 34 
U. CINN. L.R. 341 (1965). 
11 Id. 
12 RUDDY, 81Ipra note 7, at 4·12. 
181d. 
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Thus the classical writers 19 and the leading international law 
writer of the Enlightenment, Emmerich de Vattel,tll postu-
lated a natural law of nations which provided a certain basis 
for the subject's protection from his sovereign. 
In Le Droit de Gens (The Law of Nations) Emmerich de 
Vattel revealed himself as effectively one of the French philo-
sophes of the Enlightenment.18 He departed from his medie-
val predecessors by merging the doctrines of state sovereignty 
and natural law, previously representing opposing schools of 
thought.1T Le Droit de Gens quickly became the guide par 
excellence to international law and practice.1S 
Like the earlier publicists, Vattel found that individuals did 
have rights under the law of nations. He began by accept-
ing the premise that men inherit from nature a perfect lib-
erty and independence, which they enjoyed totally before the 
establishment of civil societies.19 This natural freedom is par-
tially and voluntarily surrendered to the sovereign state.20 
But the nation itself retains the natural freedom which indi-
vidual men previously enjoyed, unless it has surrendered them 
to anot~er state.21 He went on to theorize that as men are 
subject to the natural law-and since their union in society 
does not exempt them from the obligations of the natural law 
. -then the society itself, the nation, must remain subject to 
the natural law.22 The result is that the individual retains 
certain rights under natural law not only against his fellow 
men as individuals, but also against the society of men, the 
nation. Among such rights are the following: (1) The indi-
vidual's natural right to liberty of conscience, (2) The indi-
1. Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in International LaUI, 50 VlRGINlA L.R. 
435,436 (1964). 
111 Infra, pp. 74-75. 
18 Parry, foreword to RUDDY, 8upra note 7 at xi. 
17 RUDDY, supra note 7, at xiii. 
lSId. 
19 VATTEL, LE DROIT DU GENS (translated) vi (1797). 
201d. 
21Id. 
u ld. at 57. 
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vidual's right to indemnification from his sovereign for the 
value of property taken by the sovereign for use during time 
of war, and (3) The individual's right to emigrate. If the 
sovereign seeks to establish a state religion, for example, the 
law of nations requires that the sovereign respect the indi-
vidual's "conscience right" by either allowing any group to 
practice the religion of their choice, or by allowing that group 
to separate from the society with their property and to form 
a new state.-
In addition Vattel found that since the individual is born 
free, he has a natural right to decide to emigrate from his 
native country. This right to leave is not unlimited, the in-
dividual may not lawfully leave his country if to do so does 
harm to it.I' However, "if the sovereign seeks to molest 
those who have a right to emigrate, he does them an injury; 
and the injured individuals may lawfully implore the pro-
tection of the power who is willing to receive them."· 
Finally the indemnification right involves property purpose-
ly taken, and not property accidentally destroyed in battle, by 
the sovereign or destroyed for any reason by the enemy.28 
Thus the eighteenth century publicists of international law 
found, in the natural law basis of the law of nations, rights 
of individuals against sovereigns. It was the natural law 
theories of these philosophers which shook the continent of 
Europe and laid the foundation for the American and French 
Revolutions.2T 
Whether or not Vattel had a direct influence on the framers 
of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 is impos-
sible to determine. However, some of the existing documen-
tary evidence from that period lends support to the proposi-
_ Id. at 104. 
2' Id. at 107. 
211 Id. at 402, 403. 
28 BUDDY, 8'Upt'G note 7, at 33. 
lIT THE RECORDS 01' THE FRDlCBAL CONVEN'l'ION 01' 1787, (Farrand, ed. 1937); THE 
FBEILlLIBT (Cook, ed. 1961). 
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tion that the American approach to the law of nations under 
section 1350 contemplated actionable rights of individuals.2s 
At one point the federal convention of 1787 which drafted 
the United States Constitution may have considered the rights 
of aliens under the law of nations. Document VII of the 
Committee of Detail includes a rough draft of section 2 of 
Article III which defines the powers of the federal judiciary: 
"the Judiciary [shall] have authority to hear and determine 
... by Way of Appeal . . . all cases in which foreigners may 
be interested in the Construction of any Treaty . . . or on the 
Law of Nations ... -
Hamilton, in defending the final draft of Article ill on the 
judiciary argued that the provision for jurisdiction in cases 
between a "State or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens, or Subjects" is crucial since the denial of justice 
to an alien is classed, under the law of nations, as among the 
just causes of war, and the ability to pull the United States 
into war should not be left to one of the states.80 He went 
on to argue that this is obviously the case not only where 
questiot;ls of the law of nations are involved, but also where 
municipal law is involved, since the chance of a denial of 
justice is nearly as great in the latter case.81 Both of these 
sources indicate the supposition that individuals will be in-
volved in cases arising under the law of nations. Although, 
as the Second Circuit has pointed out,82 the legislative history 
of the JUdiciary Act is non-existent, it seems clear both from 
the historical background and from the contemporary theory 
of the law of nations in 1789 that the drafters of the Judiciary 
Act contemplated the use of the federal courts by individuals 
to enforce rights arising under international law. The word-
28 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 27, at 157. The pro. 
posed wording was not written into the final draft possibly because the rough draft 
found in Document VII seems to contemplate a federal judiciary with almost e:J:-
elusively appellate jurisdiction, a proposition which was rejected. 
29 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 27, at 534·541. 
SOld. 
81 lIT v. Veneap, Ltd., supra note 5, at 1015. 
82 Tucker, supra note 10, at 349. 
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ing of section 1350 should therefore not be considered a mis-
take. However, just as in 1789 the law of nations was caught 
up in the natural law theory of the eighteenth century, it 
quickly moved away from natural law as the positivist theory 
prevailed, and by the nineteenth century the law of nations 
had changed substantially from le d,.oit de gens of Vattel.81 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1789 
, Natural law theory in general declined following the revo-
lutions of the eighteenth century. At least one influencing 
factor may have been the need to stabilize the governments 
created in revolution'" Natural law theory which held that 
law is derived from a source independent of the law making 
power of the state was inherently unsuitable to the task. In-
deed, natural law theory was better suited as the weapon of 
those dissatisfied with the status quo, which the new govern-
ments now sought to maintain. To view the rights of indi-
viduals as derived from some source other than the law making 
power of the society meant that the law must necessarily be 
in a constant state of flux at least until the ideals of the rights 
of individuals under natural law could be achieved under the 
laws of society. The stability which the new governments 
of the nineteenth century sought could best be achieved by 
viewing the rights of individuals as determined by prescribed 
standards of law,u that is to say, the rights 'of individuals 
must be derived from the laws which are accepted and ap-
plied by society. This positivist view as applied to interna-
tional law maintained that international law was composed of 
those principles which are accepted and applied by nations'" 
881d. 
841d. 
811 ld. at 349-350. 
88 At the height of natural law theory in the eighteenth century the nations of 
Europe, far from abiding by the natural law, were living according to the rule of 
force. RUDDY, supra note 7, at 38-57. The rights of individuals went unrecognized, 
as did many of the rights of nations. Applying positivist theory to this situation 
it beeame clear that the individual did not have rights under the law of nations as 
it was practiced by states, despite the prior arguments of the natural law theorists. 
Lauterpaeht, The Subject8 of the Law8 of Nati01l8, 63 L.Q. Rev. 438, 439-444 (1947). 
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Since states did not recognize the rights of individuals in in-
ternational law,87 and since individuals had no procedural re-
course against states,88 except through the representation of 
their rights by their own sovereign, the positivists argued that 
the law of nations was the law of states in their relations 
toward each other and individuals had no place in this law." 
The result was the denial of individual rights under interna-
tionallaw. 
The American courts have consistently followed the reason-
ing of the positivist school and have refused to apply inter-
national law to cases involving individuals.40 The decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Dreyfus 'P. 
Von Finck 41 and the cases cited in support of it 42 are indic-
ative of the American approach. 
The plaintiff in Dreyfus, a Jew and former German resi-
dent, alleged that he had been forced to emigrate to Switzer-
land from Germany in 1938, and sold his interest in a banking 
firm to the defendants under duress, at a loss of one and one-
half million dollars." The defendants' motion to dismiss was 
granted, by the district court in a memorandum opinion dated 
January 2, 1975." The dismissal was affirmed by the Circuit 
court a which held that an individual is not the subject of 
. the law of nations 48 and that violations of international law 
do not occnr when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the 
acting state.4T 
IT Lauterpacht, rupra note 36, at 439-444. 
88Id. 
19 Lillich, The Proper Bole of DomeBtic CourtB in the InternationaZ Legal Order, 
11 VIRGINIA J. INT. L. 1 (1970). The few instances in which American courts have 
applied international law to eases involving individuals have been in instances where 
Congressional legislation has specifically required such application. Id. at 17. 
40 8upra, note 2. 
41 Bee eases cited, BUpra note 4. 
42 Bee BUpra, note 2. 
41 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d at 27. 
" Id. at 24. 
ald. at 30. 
48Id. at 31. 
n Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Bupp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958); Damaskinos v. Boeieta 
Navigaeion Interameriearia, B.A., Panama, 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and 
Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa.1963). 
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The Dreyfus court relied on the reasoning in three earlier 
district court decisions 48 in holding that an individual is not 
the subject of the law of nations. One of these cases, Pauling 
v. McElroy,49 held, without citing prior case law, that claimed 
violations of international law vest no rights in individual 
plaintiffs and may be asserted only by diplomatic negotiations 
between the sovereigns involved.lIo The other two cases cited 
rely on two prior district court decisions, Lopes v. Reederei 
Richard Schroder II! and Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. CUft.1I1 
In Lopes the Court was confronted with a claim by an alien 
longshoreman against an alien shipowner for injuries result-
ing from the unseaworthiness of the defendant's vesseI.1I3 The 
Court followed traditional positivist doctrine, defining the law 
of nations as "the body of rules and principles of action 
which are binding on civilized states in their relations with 
one another." It 
Unseaworthiness, however, is a doctrine unique to Ameri-
can courts, and does not come from the law of nations." A 
violation of the law of nations would consist of "a violation 
by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or cus-
48 1641'. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1968). 
49Id. at 393. 
110 2251'. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
1111951'. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). 
DGfII(J87rift08, svprG, note 47 involved a claim by a seaman for injuries on board 
a ship owned by the American and Panamanian defendants. The court held, ,nt6r 
GliG, that unseaworthiness of a vessel is not a violation of the law of nations, citing 
Lop", svprG note 50. 
YGJGngIJ, npTIJ note 47. Was an action by a Russian beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy against the insured, based on the insurers failure to pay under the policy. 
The insurer moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court 
held, inter IJlia, that the suit was in contract not in tort as required by section 1350, 
and further, even if a tort, the action complained of was not a violation of the 
law of nations as contemplated by that section. la. at 321. The court cited Lop" 
and AdTIJ, svprG, for the proposition that a violation within the meaning of section 
1350 must be conduct which "transcends the violation of local norms ... since 
it is injected with overtones which infringe upon the standards which nations have 
established to control their relationships with one another." la. at 328. 
IlILopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
113 ld. at 291, n.29. 
114 Id. at 295. 
IIIIId. at 297. 
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toms (a) affecting the relationship between states or between 
an individual and a foreign state and (b) used by those states 
for their common good and/or in dealings inter se." 1i8 
U sing this reasoning, jurisdiction could be had under sec-
tion 1350 on the facts found in Abdul-Rahman Omar Adm v. 
Clift.n The plaintiff in Adm brought his action against his 
former wife, a Lebanese citizen, who allegedly had taken 
their daughter, also a Lebanese citizen, to the United States 
on a falsely obtained Iranian passport to prevent the plain-
tiff from taking lawful custody of the child under Moslem 
law.lis The conduct of the defendant was a violation of local 
norms thus giving rise to an actionable tort. Further, in 
obtaining the false passport the defendant was found to have 
violated the right of Lebanon to control the issuance of pass-
ports to its citizens.59 Thus her conduct "transcended the 
violation of local norms ... since it [was] injected with over-
tones which impinge upon the standards which nations have 
established to control their relationships with one another." 80 
The rule set out in the Adm case indicates a two-tiered test. 
First, t,he conduct must violate the rights of the individual 
under local "norms" 81 and second, the conduct must also 
violate the rights of a nation under the law of nations. But 
1i8 The Adra case is the only one in which a court found jurisdiction for the 
plaintiff on a claim of tort in violation of the law of nations. 
1i7 Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp_ at 860-862. 
118 Id. at 864-865. 
1i9 Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 47, at 328, summarizing 
the Adra holding. 
80 The fact that Valanga, ld., characterizes the conduct giving rise to jurisdiction 
under this section as a violation of local "norms" rather than local "law" indio 
cates that conduct contrary to local custom or usage may also fall within the juris, 
diction of section 1350, so long as it is also a violation of a nation's rights under the 
law of nations. It follows from this that under the Adra-Valanga approach the 
section is more than simply jurisdictional, it also creates substantive rights. But 
the effect is not to create substantive rights under the law of nations since the wrong 
committed to a nation by the conduct of the defendant is collateral to the wrong 
committed to the plaintiff. Instead the Adm-Valanga approach turns the violation 
of local "norms," i.e_ custom or usage, into a violation of law, which it may not 
in fact have been under loeal "law." 
61 Supra at pp. 79-80. 
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the plaintiff need not be a national of the wronged nation, 
nor must the wronged nation be a party to the action. 
Although the Adm decision finds jurisdiction under section 
1350, it is based on the positivist doctrine that individuals 
are not the subject of the law of nations and the reasoning 
of that case is weak. The defendant in Adra may indeed 
have violated the right of a sovereign state, but any harm to 
the plaintiff was purely coincidental and arose not from a vio-
lation of his rights under the law of nations, but rather un-
der local "norms" if at all. The court interpreted section 
1350 as having as a threshhold requirement a violation of 
a sovereign's rights by the defendant for. the plaintiff to have 
jurisdiction to remedy damages generally sounding in tort. 
As indicated above 82 this was not the original theory behind 
section 1350, and as argued infra 118 it should not be the theory 
now.86 
62 Infra at p. 76. 
118 Besides holding that individuals do not have actionable rights under the law 
of nations the Dreyfus court also held that even if section 1350 allowed individuals 
to bring such claims, violations of international law do not occur when the aggrieved 
parties are nationals of the acting state. Dreyfu8 v. Von Finck, 8'Upra note 2 at 
31. In support of this holding, the court relied on dicta in the dissent of Justice 
White in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, (1964, White, J. dis-
senting) (In distinguishing a line of cases in which courts had apparently held 
that an attitude of caution and self-restraint should be used in dealing with the 
laws of a foreign nation from the Sabbatino case which involved a claim of the 
violation of the law of nations, Justice White said that in these prior eases viola-
tions of international law were not present, since the parties were nationals of the 
acting state. He went on to argue that the. act of state doctrine should not prevent 
adjudication where the acting state acted in violation of international law. 376 
U.S. 441-443), and on the holding of the New York court in Salimoff v. Standard 
Oil Co. of New York, 262 N.Y. 220; 186 N.E. 679 (1933). In the latter case, the 
Soviet government confiscated all oil lands in Russia through nationalization and 
sold oil extracted therefrom to the defendants. The former owners, Russian na-
tionals, brought an equitable action for an accounting on the theory that the 
seizures by the unrecognized Soviet government were merely thefts and title to 
the property and the right to its proceeds remained in the plaintiffs. The New 
York court held that the fact that the Soviet government was unrecognized by 
the United States made it no less a de facto government, and as a sovereign gov-
ernment it did no legal wrong according to the law of nations when it confiscated 
the oil of its own nationals. The result is that such a claim by individual plaintiffs 
against their sovereign must arise if at all under the laws of the sovereigu na-
tion, and not under international law. 262 N_Y. at 227. While this holding is 
consistent with general positivist theory, it is contrary to the natural law theory 
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THE INDIVIDUAL As THE SUBJECT OJ!' INTEB1UTIONAL LAw 
It can no longer be said that sovereign states are the sole 
subjects of the law of nations. Since the late nineteenth 
century there have appeared a number of international bodies, 
subject to the law of nations, which are not sovereign states. 
Thus Lauterpacht describes the following instances in which 
a non-sovereign body was accorded international recognition: 
Between the annexation of the Papal State by Italy in 1870 
and the restoration of its temporal sovereignty in 1929, the 
Holy See concluded treaties and entertained diplomatic re-
lations with most sovereign states.· 
The British Dominions, although part of the British Com-
monwealth of Nations which was represented in the interna-
tional sphere by Great Britain alone, engaged in treaty making 
and diplomatic relations." 
And more recently a large number of international public 
bodies, including the United Nations and its many affiliated 
agencies, have been recognized as international personalities 
for the purposes of international law.IT 
of the law of nations, and is also contrary to the growing awareneu of individual 
human rights under international law. 
It is also interesting to note that even during the period of Positivist domina-
tion in international law theory in the nineteenth and early twentieth century one 
~hool which espoused the theory that intervention against another sovereign was 
legally permissible to protect the rights of nationals of that sovereign. See BROWN-
LIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE 01' FORCE BY &UTU, 338-342 (1963); Bow-
ever misused in practice, the theory did imply that individuals have rights against 
their own sovereigns cognizable in some manner under international law. 
84 Lauterpacht, npTa note 36, at 445. 
8111d. at 445-46. 
181d. at 446-500 • 
.., The Bevised Convention of Mannheim for the Navigation of the Rhine, reprinted 
in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNKENTAL OIwANIZATIONS - CONSTI'l'UTlONAL DoC1JJlENTS 
159-75 (Peaslee, ed. 1956). 
The convention sets out various regulations for the navigation of the Rhine and 
establishes Rhine navigation courts, which under Article 34, ~ 2 are competent to 
hear "civil cases for decision in summary legal proceedings about complaints: 
(a) on account of payment of fees for pilots, crane, 'Wage' harbour and bulwark 
and of their amount, 
(b) on account of congestion of the towing-path done by private persona, 
(e) on account of clamAges which were caused by skippers and raftsmen to others 
on the way or during the landing, 
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This broadening to include non-sovereign bodies among those 
considered subject to the law of nations is paralleled by the 
recognition by treaty of the rights of individuals against sov-
ereigns under international law. The individual was recog-
nized as an entity under international law as early as 1815, 
by the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine 
under the terms of the Fnal Act of Vienna,88 and again by 
the European Commission of the. Danube, created by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1856.89 Later the Central American Court 
of Justice, created in 1907,T° and the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
following World War I,Tl recognized the right of individuals 
to bring claims against other governments without support 
of their own governments. These examples indicate a ten-
dency to accept the standing of individuals to enforce their 
rights in international forums without the need for interven-
tion on their behalf by their government. Developments since 
World War n reinforce this tendency. 
(d) on aeeount of damages in landed property when pulling craft to the charge of 
the owners of draught-horsea.' , 
Article 37 further provides for appeals by individuals of decisions of the Rhine 
navigation court&. 
88 INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZTIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 
380-388 (Peaslee, ed.1961), cited in Tucker, suprG note 10, at 335. 
89 Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, 2 
FoUIGN REL. U.S. 697 (1908). Article II of the Convention provided: 
"This court shall take cognizance of the questions which individuals of olle 
Central American country may raise against any of the other contracting Governments, 
because of the violations of treaties or conventions, and other eases of an interna-
tional character; no matter whether their own Government supports said claim or 
not; and provided that the remedies which the laws of the respective country provide 
against such a violation shan have been exhausted or that denial of jnstiee shall 
have been ahown. " 
'10 E.g. Agreement between the United States and Germany (for a mixed com-
mission to determine the amount to be paid by Germany in satisfaction of Germany's 
1lnaneial obligations imder the treaty concluded by the two Governments on August 
25,1921). August 10,1922,42 Stat. 2200. 
Article I of the Agreement provided: 
"The commiaaion shall paas upon the following categories of claims. • • 
(1) Claims of American citizens, arising since July 31, 1914, in respect of damage 
to, or seizure of, their property, rights and interests, including any company or 
association in which they are interested, within German territory as it existed on 
August 1, 1914. . ." 
'116 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int'l. Mll. Trib.1946). 
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One important step in establishing the individual in inter-
national law was the decision of the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
There the judges discarded the traditional doctrine that only 
states could be liable under international law and held that 
individuals must also be held responsible for their actions: 
"Crimes against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced." T3 The principles upon which this holding was 
predicated were set out first in the Charter of the Tribunal 
itself,T8 after the acts of the defendants were actually per-
formed. It would be difficult to rationalize the holding on 
positivist theory since liability was found for acts not pre-
viously considered crimes, under law never before enforced. 
A more realistic approach would be to view the finding as an 
application of naturallaw.T' The Charter of the tribunal and 
its finding defined law as it ought to be, grounded on the right 
and wrong in the nature of things which is the natural law. 
Such an approach, as shown in the discussion of Vattel's 
theory,T,1I is more conducive to the recognition of the rights 
and obligations of individuals as the subject of international 
law than is the positivist approach. 
In addition to the Nuremberg court's finding of the liability 
of individuals in international law, the increased awareness 
of human rights since World War II indicates a growing ac-
ceptance of the individual as the subject of international law. 
The U.N. Charter provides that one of its purposes is to 
"achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and en-
couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
T2Charter of International Military Tribunal, 39 Ax. J. INT'L. L. Sun. 258 
(1945) Article 6 of the Charter provided that "persecution on politieal, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the juris· 
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated" was criminal under international law • I d. at 259·260. 
T8 Tucker, 81Ip7'1J note 10, at 357. 
Ti BuprlJ at pp. 73·74 •. 
Til U.N. CHABTl!:II, art. 1; reprinted at 59 Stat. lOn, 1037. 
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religion. " 18 A more express recognition of the position of 
the individual under international law can be found in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. This document 
goes further than the Charter in that in it are listed specific 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which each individ-
ual has." Among them are the rights to life, liberty and 
the security of person; freedom from slavery, torture, arbi-
trary arrest or detention; the right to a hearing and a pre-
sumption of innocence when charged with a crime; the right 
to freedom of movement in and between states; the right to 
own property and freedom from arbitrary deprivation of that 
property; the right to freedom of thought, opinion and peace-
ful assembly; the right to work and the right to education,18 
none of which can be deprived from the individual on the 
basis of distinctions such as "race, color, sex, language, re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status."'" 
Finally, The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms,80 signed in 1950 by thirteen Euro-
pean nations reiterated the provisions of the U.N.'s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and further established both a 
European Commission of Human Rights, to assist in the en-
forcement of those rights, and an European Court of Human 
Rights, the tribunal for claims under the convention.'l 
These developments in individual rights under the law of 
nations have been slow particularly when compared to their 
rapid disappearance in the early nineteenth century. While 
18 UNIVDSAL DECLAUTION 01' HUMAN RIGHTS reprinted at ESSAYS ON HUMAN 
BIGHTs,195 (Keith, ;r., ed.1968). 
" IbUJ. 
78 Id. at 196. 
TIl Reprinted at 45 AM.;r. INT'L. LAw Supp.24 (1951). 
80 However, the convention stopped short of allowing the individual claimant to 
bring his own action before the court. Article 48 of the Convention provides that 
either the European Commission for Human Rightsj the state whose national waa 
alleged to be a victim; the state referring the case to the courtj or the defendant 
state is the only party allowed to bring a case before the court. Id. at 35. 
81 Tucker, supra note 10, at 360-365. 
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individuals have had some limited success in international 
bodies 82 and tribunals 8S this progress has not been paralleled 
in the United States. The continued denial in American Courts 
of the rights of individuals under international law indicates 
that the traditional positivist approach is well entrenched in 
those courts. But this is not to say that international law 
IS beyond the scope of domestic courts. 
NATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS 
International law has traditionally been considered within 
the competence of national tribunals.M Under the doctrine of 
incorporation in Anglo-American law the norms of international 
law were considered part of the common law.8Ii This doc-
trine developed from the natural law theory which in appli-
cation saw both domestic law and the law of nations as part 
of the same system.88 
The positivists, dominant by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, held that international law was a source, rather than 
an integral part of the common law. Only those norms to 
which the nation had assented were to be considered the law 
of nations.8T Despite these theoretical problems as to the 
proper role of the doctrines of international law in the de-
. cisions of the courts, the capacity of the national courts to 
determine questions of international law continued to be ac-
cepted. 
But even assuming that a jurisdiction recognizes the rights 
of an individual against his or another sovereign or a third 
party under international law, should this type of claim be 
brought in a national court' 
82Id. at 858. 
8S See Lillich, B1LJWG note 89. 
MId. 
&Gld. 
8tl Id. 
8T See Falk, The RoZe of Domestic Courts in the InternatiMGZ Legal Order, 39 
INDIANA L.J. 429 (1964). This in itself is dangerous since it puts lower courts in 
the position of defining the "national good," a function which should reside in the 
executive branch. 
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There are disadvantages to the use of domestic courts in 
trying international law cases. It is possible that national 
courts might exhibit a tendency towards parochial bias. Thus 
local courts may try to avoid international issues if some as-
pect of municipal law may decide an issue, or they may even 
treat international law as secondary to both municipal law 
and national interests, refusing to apply it, either because of 
a belief that claims grounded in international law are frivo-
lous, or because resolution of such issues would not be for 
the national good. 88 These problems can be solved by an 
awareness in each court of the significance of international 
law and a respect for its applicability in individual cases. 
A particular problem in American courts has been the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine and the act of state doctrine, which 
remove the authority of the court to deal with foreign gov-
ernments in favor of the . executive branch of the federal 
government.89 But the doctrines of sovereign immunity and 
act of state seem to be gradually giving way to an increased 
appreciation for the proper role of the courts of the United 
States in trying cases. under international law. Probably the 
most important step in this regard was the enactment of the 
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1964 10 which effectively reverses the presumption that the 
courts are precluded from hearing a case involving a ~oreign 
taking of property under the act of state doctrine. Under 
the amendment a court is prevented from hearing the case 
only if the executive actively intervenes in an individual case 
for reasons of national policy.'l 
88 A Discussion of the doctrines of sovereign immunity and Act of State is 
be70nd the aeope of this article~ However, they have been amp17 discU8led else· 
where. See e.g., Lillich, supra note 39, at 18·37 and materials cited· therein. See 
renerally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 63 at 439 (White, J., 
dissenting) j Alfred Dunhill of London,· Inc. v.· Republic of Cuba, 96 B.Ct. 1854, 
425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
89 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2). 
10 With this power still left in the hands of the executive the role of the national 
judiciary in deciding international questions remains improperly restricted according 
to Lillich, supra, note 39, at 35·37. 
91 E.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free· 
doms, Art. 48 j supra, note 79 at 35. 
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Indeed, there are distinct advantages to the presence of 
international law cases in domestic courts. International tri-
bunals are not often available to the individual plaintiff.'1 Even 
when available, such courts can be both costly and cumber-
some, so much so that even the sovereign states may hesi-
tate to use them.1I8 National courts are by comparison cheaper 
and less burdensome, if ony in terms of the simplicity of the 
court's mechanisms for bri~ging an action. The presence of 
international law cases in domestic courts would also have a 
tendency to educate the public in the various nations about 
international law, and this communication would help foster 
the acceptance of international law and serve as a source of 
mutual constraint." 
CONCLUSION 
There is ample support for the proposition that claims by 
aliens under the law of nations should be allowed in federal 
courts under section 1350. The statute itself is rooted in the 
theory ,of natural law in which this nation was conceived. 
But in this century, with its gradual rebirth of respect for 
the individual's role at the international level, the courts of 
the United States still deny the individual the enforcement 
of his rights on the basis of the now outmoded positivist theory. 
The individual's ability to pursue his rights whether in a 
domestic court or in an international tribunal along with the 
still hoped for enforcement of those same human rights on 
a broader scale by organizations such as the United Nations 
will eventually be a vital progressive step toward an orderly 
and just world.-
112Baxter, Dedication to Hardy Cross DiZlard: Introduction, 11 VmoINlA J. INT'!.. 
L.293 (1971). 
98 FaIk, supra, note 87, at 440·442. 
"See Lillich, supra note 39, at 37 quoting Falk, The 8abbatino Controversy in 
THE AJ'TEIWATH 01' SARBATINO 51 (Tondel, ed. 1965). 
116 Id. at 49. 
1977J ALIEN TOBT OLAntS 89 
Whether it will be done by the courts, by the Congress, or 
even by a Constitutional amendment as has been suggested,IIO 
the courts of the United States should be open to these claims. 
THOMAS P. CROTTY 
116 ld. at 49. 
